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 Mead and the
 International
 Mind
 Marilyn Fischer
 Abstract
 In this paper I analyze the conceptions of
 internationalism and the international
 mind that Mead uses in "The Psychological
 Bases of Internationalism" (1915); in his
 1917 Chicago Herald columns defending
 U.S. entry into the war; in Mind, Self, and
 Society (1934); and in "National-
 Mindedness and International Minded-
 ness" (1929). I show how the terms
 "internationalism" and "the international
 mind" arose within conversations among
 some Anglo-American thinkers. While
 Mead employs these terms in his own
 philosophical and sociological theorizing,
 he draws their meaning from these conver-
 sations and does not generate their meaning
 from within his own theorizing. This places
 Mead among the "conservative internation-
 alists" of his time. With this analysis, I then
 show how Hans Joas's criticisms of Mead's
 support for the war are misplaced. I also
 show how Meads internationalism, cor-
 rectly understood, cannot support Mitchell
 Aboulafias construction of Mead's cosmo-
 politan self. Throughout, I demonstrate
 how Mead's discussions of internationalism
 need to be read in historical context, and
 are more political than scholars such as
 Aboulafia and Joas have supposed.
 Keywords: Mitchell Aboulafia, Hans Joas,
 George Herbert Mead, First World War,
 Internationalism, International Mind
 March 1919. President Wilson had
 returned to the United States from the Paris
 Peace Conference with a draft treaty of the
 proposed League of Nations.1 Illinois Sena-
 tor Medill McCormick opposed the Treaty.
 Mead responded to McCormick, stating
 that America "maintains no rights and seeks
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 no ends that are not defensible before the reason and common interests g
 of the world." A tidy statement, this is, and compatible with Mitchell 8
 Aboulafia's elegant analysis of Mead the internationalist and advocate of p
 international mindedness, whom Aboulafia places in companionable o-
 dialogue with Kant's sensus communis, with Arendt's community of all tr
 humanity, and with Smiths impartial spectator. However, the mood ^
 darkens when we realize that Mead made this claim immediately after FJ
 asserting that the League of Nations was needed to safeguard the Mon- g
 roe Doctrine. Without that backing "we will find ourselves faced by a %
 league of Latin nations in America, resentful of our assertion of S^
 supremacy in this hemisphere. Over against such a league we would be g
 compelled to maintain a vast military establishment and our whole life 5'
 would be vitiated by the very system against which we took up arms in
 a Prussianized Germany."2 Mead saw the League of Nations as a guar- *
 antor of U.S. hegemony over Latin America, thus relieving the United S
 States of the burden of maintaining "a vast military establishment" 2
 through which to accomplish the same end. Mead s endorsement of ><
 U.S. hegemony in Latin America does not sit well with Kant's, Arendt's ^
 and Smith's visions of humanity. How are we to understand his advo- 5
 cacy of internationalism and international mindedness? x
 In this paper I will show how Meads discussions of internationalism *
 and the international mind were his contributions to conversations tak-
 ing place among some Anglo-American thinkers. The terms' meanings
 arose within these conversations. While Mead employs these terms in
 his own philosophical and sociological theorizing, he draws their mean-
 ing from these conversations and does not generate their meaning from
 within his own theorizing. In Part One I describe the conversation
 within which the "international mind" played a role, and in Parts Two
 through Five I examine how Mead participated in this conversation
 between 1915 and 1929. Part Two focuses on his 1915 article, "The
 Psychological Basis for Internationalism." Here I show how Mead
 places then current conceptions of internationalism within his own
 philosophical and sociological theorizing. In Part Three I show how
 Meads 1917 Chicago Herald columns defending U.S. entry into the
 war and his support for the League to Enforce Peace place him among
 "conservative internationalists," and argue that Hans Joas's criticisms of
 Mead's support for the war are misplaced.3 In Part Four I examine
 Mead's comments about the international mind in Mind, Self, and Soci-
 ety, and show how these passages do not support Aboulafias construc-
 tion of Mead's cosmopolitanism. Finally, in Part Five I examine Mead's
 1929 essay, "National-Mindedness and International Mindedness,"
 and show how it reveals gaps in Mead's theorizing. Throughout, I
 demonstrate how Mead's discussions of internationalism need to be
 read in historical context, and are more political than scholars such as
 Aboulafia and Joas have supposed. ^
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 co /. The "International Mind"
 <u In the early decades of the twentieth-century, lots of "minds" were
 g bandied about by various Anglo-American thinkers. Dewey gives us the
 d "national mind," the "social mind," the "legal mind," the "popular
 Z mind," the "forewarned mind," and finally, the "post-war mind."4 Ran-
 ^ dolph Bourne added the "war mind," the "state mind," and the "herd
 <u mind" to the "international mind."5 British philosopher L.P. Jacks
 6 commented that before the war, the "British mind" did not have the
 - "mind" of an imperial power, that is, the citizens of Britain "found it
 £> difficult to retain the imperial point of view."6 Horace Kallen thought
 ^ the most internationally minded people were international financiers
 ^ and entrepreneurs, who had figured out how to profit handsomely dur-
 ^ ing both peace and wartime.7
 HH The "international mind" functioned as a cultural buzzword. Edu-
 £-h cators said the curriculum needed to become more internationally
 QJ minded.8 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace established
 <J International Mind Alcoves in many community libraries.9 Sinclair
 c/D Lewis in Main Street, bemoans, "Though a Gopher Prairie regards itself
 Z as a part of the Great World, ... it will not acquire the scientific spirit,
 <í the international mind, which would make it great.10
 Ph There were cynics. Samuel Crowther thought Adam Smith per-
 H formed a sleight-of-hand with his "cosmopolitan theories ... the same
 theories which turn up today in the guise of the international mind."
 Because Great Britain waited until its manufacturing sector was far
 ahead of everyone else's before removing its tariffs, and only then pro-
 claimed free trade an economic verity, Crowther labeled Smith "a highly
 skilled British ballyhoo artist who succeeded in elevating national expe-
 diency to the plane of highly respectable economic theory."11
 Like "globalization" and "diversity" today, the international mind had
 no precise definition, yet it functioned within a particular conversation
 among some Anglo-American thinkers. These thinkers believed that
 widespread international engagement existed as a matter of fact, and that
 by participating in these engagements, people could develop interna-
 tional minds. They thought war was a barbaric regression away from civ-
 ilized behavior, and that international organizations should be established
 through which disputes could be addressed through negotiation rather
 than war. Their politics varied widely. Some remained pacifists through-
 out the war; others supported the war effort whole-heartedly. Some were
 conservative laissez-faire capitalists; others leaned toward socialism. Their
 thinking on imperialism and government-sponsored social reform
 showed the same variability. Since I do not know what Mead read, I will
 restrict my sources for this paper to people I know that Mead knew, and
 to people whose writings were widely available to educated Americans.
 British participants in this conversation included Bertrand Russell,
 ,. - ^ Oxford professor and one-time Royce student L.P. Jacks, and Cambridge
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 professor G. Lowes Dickinson, all of whom published in the Atlantic g
 Monthly and in the University of Chicago's International Journal of Ethics. 2
 Nicolas Murray Butler, philosopher, and long-time President of p
 Columbia University, claimed to have coined the phrase, "the interna- o-
 tional mind," and represented the more establishment and conservative &*
 side of the conversation. In his 1912 address to the assembled political, g-<
 legal, and business elites at the Lake Mohonk Conference on Interna- R
 tional Arbitration, Butler gave this explicit definition. "The interna- g
 tional mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign %'
 relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which |_
 regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and cooper- g
 ating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing com- 5'
 mercé and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture
 throughout the world."12 For Butler the context for discussions about
 the international mind was how to substitute "Law for war, peace with S
 righteousness for triumph after slaughter, the victories of right and rea- 2
 sonableness for those of might and brute force."13 In a jab at Theodore 5
 Roosevelt, Butler said that to swagger, swing sticks, and threaten mili- ^
 tary action was not in keeping with the international mind.14 5
 Butlers concept of the international mind functioned within the x
 late nineteenth century's historical trajectory of social evolution from ¡a
 the stage of barbarism, where groups settled differences by force,
 toward the growth of civilized societies, characterized by science, learn-
 ing, art, and culture. Societies became more civilized as reason gained
 control over instinct and unruly passions. International commerce and
 international juridical and legal institutions contributed to peaceful
 internationalism among civilized nations.15 Like most people in this
 conversation, Butler assumed that "international" referred to "the civi-
 lized world," i.e., European nations, and white settler colonies such as
 Canada and Australia. The United States as a white settler ex-colony,
 and sometimes Japan and some South American republics, were also
 included. Colonized peoples and territories lagged behind on the path
 toward civilization, so it was consistent with international morality and
 justice that they be colonized.16
 For Butler and many others, an international mind is not opposed
 to war per se. When "civilized nations" fail to resolve disputes peace-
 ably, nations may respond to aggressors with violence. Butler praised
 Germany, France and Great Britain for their adjudication of the Agadir
 affair, in which Germany gave up its claim in French-dominated
 Morocco, in exchange for a slice of the Congo. Better to negotiate these
 matters as civilized gentlemen, than to fight as barbarians.17
 Many Europeans and Americans assumed that civilized nations had
 outgrown the barbaric and adolescent practice of going to war. Highly
 respected and widely quoted theorists such as Jean de Bloch and Nor-
 man Angeli documented the extensive economic interdependence -
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 ro among "civilized" nations, and predicted that none of the Great Powers
 <u would be foolish enough to destabilize this commerce by going to
 g war.18 Bourne reminisced on the pre-war years, "The 'international
 d mind' was becoming more and more universal, so that an inter-
 Z European war would be dreaded with the horror of a civil conflict."19
 <u //. "The Psychological Basis for Internationalism, " 1915
 6 To internationally minded Europeans and Anglo-Americans, the Great
 - War's eruption in August 1914 was incomprehensible. Why were so
 £> many Europeans with international minds - scientists, intellectuals,
 ^ artists, and socialists - instantly overcome with nationalistic fervor?
 ^ Mead addressed this question in his March 1915 essay, "The Psycho-
 ^v logical Basis for Internationalism," published in Survey, a. leading social
 _ reform journal. Mead's starting premise, that the war had untethered
 f- i hostile impulses from the influences of reason and civilizing experience,
 QJ was widely shared at the time. His conclusion, that the international
 <J order, based on independent, sovereign nation-states, was deeply dys-
 c/3 functional, was also part of the conversation. What Mead added was his
 ^ own psychological analysis of these phenomena.20 While Mead framed
 <í his discussion in terms of his own theory of the social self, the concep-
 P^ tion of internationalism that he used is consistent with the internation-
 H alism of Butler and others. Using an analogy between the social setting
 within which the self is constructed, and the international setting
 within which nation-states are constituted, Mead in this essay points
 out the psychological costs of insisting on full national sovereignty and
 the contradictions involved in holding commitments both to the right
 of national self-defense and to internationalism.
 Mead shared the belief of Butler and others that existing interna-
 tional organization, particularly in international commerce and inter-
 national law, was highly developed, making war between European
 nations unnecessary.21 Mead saw no reason for nations to fight any-
 more. Constitutions had been adopted which provided for orderly
 change in government; international commerce gave access to labor
 and resources, eliminating the need to conquer new territories.22 In this
 essay Mead explores the psychological implications of the fact that all
 the belligerents claimed they were fighting in self-defense.23 Mead
 explains that in fighting to defend their country, people experience
 "overwhelming moments of emotion" of "complete identification with
 each other in the whole community." Mead says these experiences are
 akin to those of saints and martyrs; i.e., the "types of the highest expe-
 riences that human nature has attained."24 The war raises the question,
 "Are these (spiritual experiences) so valuable that we can afford to pur-
 chase them at the expense of Armageddon?"25
 Using then prevalent psychological theories of primitive social
 - - 2 instincts and impulses, Mead describes how this emotional high cannot
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 be sustained, but soon devolves into hatred of enemy.26 Mead writes, g
 "To defend successfully their own, men get down to the primitive 8
 instincts from which spring battle-fury, the lust of carnage, rape and p
 rapine."27 As the war continues, ones hard-earned civility is over- o-
 whelmed by primitive impulses. Mead also identifies psychological sr
 instabilities that accompany the claim that military preparedness is the ~
 best guarantee for peace. When a nation maintains a stance of readiness fj
 for war, a significant percentage of the population must be in a position g
 of unthinking, unquestioning obedience to command. Mead com- §•
 ments, "It is not and cannot be a nation in conscious control of its own g^
 policies and its own fortunes."28 g
 Mead applies his theory of the social construction of the self to the 5'
 international arena. He makes an analogy between the self as consti-
 tuted through social interaction, and nation-states acquiring a sense of #
 identity through engagement in the international community. Just as S
 the self becomes a self through "taking the attitude of another," so, £
 Mead writes, "Nations, like individuals, can become objects to them- 5
 selves only as they see themselves through the eyes of others."29 That is, ^
 nation-states become conscious of themselves as nations through par- £
 ticipating in the international arena. Mead cites the extensive interna- x
 tional contacts and organization that led to growth in industry, science, &
 commerce, and social reform as evidence that an international society
 in fact already existed.30 He points out the contradiction entailed by
 war, in which a nation seeks to destroy the other nations that provide it
 with the very setting required for its own national self-consciousness.31
 When a nations insistence on exclusive national sovereignty is acti-
 vated by militarism, growth toward international community is threat-
 ened. Mead makes his own jab at Roosevelt's hyperbolic masculinist,
 militaristic rhetoric. While this rhetoric supports "the feeling of an
 enlarged personality," Mead spurns its "childish assumption that we
 must pull down amid fire and slaughter the whole structure of the west-
 ern world to secure bulging sinews, deep chests, and red blood corpus-
 cles." He sides with those social reformers whom the militarists deride
 as "white-blooded and feministic." Growth toward internationalism
 through social reform is "vastly more intelligently conceived," while
 nation-state militarism leads to human catastrophe.32 His Survey read-
 ers would have appreciated this confirmation.
 In the final paragraph of the essay, Mead identifies the core issue:
 Militarism is not simply an evil in itself. It is typical and conservative
 of a state that is narrowly national in its attitude and that refuses to
 recognize the international society, that after all has made the self-
 conscious state possible. The problem is then largely a psychological
 problem, for it has to do with the change of attitude, the willingness
 to accept the whole international fabric of society, and to regard the
 states and the communities of which they are the instruments, as 513
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 CO subject to and controlled by the life of the whole, not as potential ene-
 q3 mies for whose assault each state must be forever on the watch.
 a
 3 Mead is saying that if states recognized how their existence
 Z depended on "the whole international fabric of society," and accepted
 ^ their position in this fabric, it would be the end of state-sovereignty as
 v traditionally conceived, and the end to a unilateral, national right to
 g self-defense.33
 -3 In this essay Mead speaks in his own voice in articulating the anal-
 £> ogy between selves in society and nations in an international commu-
 nity. However, his political conclusions regarding sovereignty, placed in
 h^ the context of Anglo-American discussions of internationalism at that
 time, were not novel or radical, nor were they generated from within his
 ¿~ own theorizing. G. Lowes Dickinson in his December 1914 and Janu-
 £_, ary 1915 Atlantic Monthly articles, gave highly detailed critiques of
 qj national sovereignty. Bertrand Russell called war among civilized
 «^ nations an anachronism, and claimed that "So long as the principle of
 c/D self-defense is recognized as affording a sufficient justification for war,
 JZ¡ this tragic conflict of irresistible claims remains unavoidable."34
 <J We should also note what Mead does not discuss in this article. He
 q¿ does not speculate on the origins of war. He does not discuss territorial
 H or economic imperialism, or whether internationalism entails opposi-
 tion to all war. His references to internationalism in this essay pertain
 to political relations among nation-states, and do not suggest a "com-
 munity of all humanity," or the perspective of an impartial spectator.
 That is, the essay is different from, but consistent with the internation-
 alism of Butler and others described above.
 ///. Mead's War-time Essays, July-August 1917
 In his May 1917 address to the National Conference on Foreign Rela-
 tions, Butler used his definition of the international mind in justifying
 U.S. entrance into the war. Butler argued that the Allies represented the
 international mind, while the Germans were pursuing hegemonic con-
 trol of the world. Thus, it was morally justified for the Allied Powers to
 use force on behalf of law, justice, right, and the international mind.35
 This analysis is consistent with Butlers pre-war conceptions of interna-
 tionalism and the appropriate use of force.
 During the war many theorists and activists held a range of positions
 which all fit under the wider umbrella of "internationalism." Historian
 Thomas Knock helpfully sorts American internationalists into progres-
 sive and conservative wings. He places Jane Addams, Emily Balch, Max
 and Crystal Eastman, and some other progressives and socialists among
 what he calls the "progressive internationalists." Knock writes, "Jane
 Addams played a pivotal role in this wing of the internationalist move-
 ment; indeed, she personified its purposes and values perhaps better
This content downloaded from 131.238.108.120 on Tue, 14 Mar 2017 16:56:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 than anyone else."36 Progressive internationalists worked for a nego ti- g
 ated end to the conflict. They feared that an Allied military victory 8
 would result in a victor's peace, sowing seeds of resentment and hatred p
 that would lead to future wars.37 o-
 Knock places Butler, Elihu Root, and Former President William Er
 Howard Taft with the conservative internationalists, a larger, wealthier, •- •
 and more elite establishment group, who thought a decisive military vie- FJ
 tory over Germany was imperative. Most had supported U.S. ventures g
 in the Caribbean, and did not consider these economic and military §•
 excursions as imperialistic. Former President Taft, along with other con- jj^
 servative internationalists, founded the League to Enforce Peace. They g
 proposed that nations form a league that would offer arbitration and 5'
 conciliation for international disputes. They were concerned with inter-
 national legal machinery, and in contrast to progressive internationalists, #
 were not concerned with economic causes of war or with the undemoc- S
 ratic character of foreign policy. Economist Theodore Marburg stated, 2
 "The principal declared purpose of the League to Enforce Peace is to 5
 make war, immediate and certain war, upon any nation which goes to ^
 war without a previous hearing of the dispute." Mead was a member of 5
 the League to Enforce Peace and gave speeches on its behalf.38 x
 Meads wartime articles for the Chicago Herald supporting the U.S. &
 entry into the war are consistent with conservative internationalism.
 Like Butler, Mead in these articles frames the war as a fight between
 German autocracy and the Allies' democracy. He alludes to points he
 made in 1915 regarding the costs of war, but claims that Germany left
 the U.S. with no options. The U.S. had to enter the war, in order to
 eliminate war as "the arbiter of international life."39
 We may not like Mead's positions, but Joas is incorrect in calling
 Mead's support for the war "an about-face" and as demonstrating "the
 fall of the internationalist Mead into the sin of nationalism."40 Mead's
 stance in 1917 represented the dominant form of internationalism at
 the time, and was consistent with the form of internationalism he had
 advocated in 1915 in "The Psychological Basis for Internationalism."
 Joas also claims that "Mead's acceptance of Wilson's foreign policy was
 possible only because it rested on a profound naivety regarding the eco-
 nomic motives behind American foreign policy," that is, Mead was
 naive to think that "imperialism was only a problem of the political
 relations among states, not an economic one."41 It is true that Mead did
 not define U.S. economic policies as imperialistic. In his August 2,
 1917 Chicago Herald article, Mead asserts explicitly that the U.S. has
 never had and could never have imperialistic aims, and that its foreign
 policy regarding imperialism as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine was
 only that of excluding European powers from colonizing in this hemi-
 sphere.42 I do not think Mead's positions here indicate naivety. To
 interpret his statements, we need a brief detour through the Monroe -
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 co Doctrine. Never formally enacted into law, the Monroe Doctrine
 <u evolved out of statements President James Monroe made to Congress in
 g 1823, warning the monarchs of Europe not to attempt further colo-
 d nization in the western hemisphere. The phrase, "Monroe Doctrine"
 Z was coined thirty years later during a Congressional debate.43 In 1904
 33 President Roosevelt issued his famous "Corollary," essentially turning
 <u the Doctrine into a justification for economic and military interven-
 6 tions in Latin American countries to "maintain order within their
 ^g boundaries and behave with a just regard for their obligations toward
 í> outsiders." The "order and justice regard" he had in mind was getting
 ^ Caribbean and Central American nations to pay debts they owed to
 ^ European and American corporations and governments. Under the
 ^ Corollary, Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson intervened militarily
 _ several times in the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico.44 Many
 f-H conservative internationalists at the time were well aware of this prac-
 QJ tice and did not regard it as a form of imperialism, but thought it was
 <^ fully appropriate.45 Mead's references to the Monroe Doctrine in his
 <-o war essays and in his reply to Senator McCormick mentioned above are
 Z consistent with this form of conservative internationalism.
 <í Mead knew of the counter-position. He had reviewed Addams's
 P4 1 907 book, Newer Ideals of Peace > in which she argued explicitly against
 H economic imperialism, basing her critique in part on John Hobson's
 widely read book from 1902, Imperialism, It is interesting that in his
 review, Mead focuses on Addamss chapters that deal with internal
 social reform, but he does not comment on the linkage Addams sees
 between international commerce and militaristic imperialism.46 Also,
 the Woman's Peace Party was a very vocal critic of Wilson's Caribbean
 and Mexican ventures. Addams was the national president of the
 Woman's Peace Party; Mary McDowell, head resident of the University
 Settlement House where Mead was a trustee, Mead's wife, Helen Cas-
 tle Mead, and aunt, Dr. Myrna Mead, were members of the Chicago
 chapter.47 My point is that Mead's stance on U.S. participation in the
 war was not uninformed or naive. With Joas, I think Mead was wrong,
 but one can be wrong without being naive.
 We could, of course, direct at Mead the criticism that Bourne
 directed at Dewey, that supporting the war was contrary to the tenets of
 pragmatism. We could also use Addams s critique that as means shape
 ends, it is a contradiction to expect the violence of war to issue in an
 international, democratic peace.48 For now, my only point is that
 Mead's support for the war was consistent with his previous writings,
 and consistent with a form of internationalism widely held at the time.
 ///. The International Mind in Mind, Self, and Society49
 Mead makes several scattered references to the international mind In
 _ £ Mind, Self, and Society. Aboulafia uses some of these passages in his
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 book, The Cosmopolitan Self, to support his construction of Mead s cos- g
 mopolitanism. He begins with Mead s conception of the social self, in 2
 which the self internalizes the "generalized other," or "the expectations p
 of the organized group." People who participate in multiple groups, o-
 e.g., families, clubs, political parties, and so on, can develop imagina- B-
 tion and mental flexibility as they move among these different points of gr1
 view.50 Aboulafia refers to Mead's examples of the international scien- <?
 tifie community, and abstract groups of creditors and debtors to illus- g
 trate how some communities are wider and more inclusive than others. %'
 He writes, "These wider communities should be understood in terms §_
 of generalized others that are more inclusive, and they can be more >•
 inclusive because they operate at higher levels of abstraction." Through 3'
 this process, he claims, participants can develop international minded-
 ness.51 Aboulafia stresses Meads naturalism and empiricism, yet sees
 companionship between Mead's international mind and Kant's sensus 2
 communis and enlarged mentality, Arendt's notion of membership in a g
 world community by virtue of being human, and Smiths impartial í
 spectator.52 ^
 Now I like Aboulafia's book very much and think it is a legitimate £
 and fruitful way to do philosophy. The following comments are not x
 intended as a thorough critique of the book. What I show here is that *
 Mead's references to the international mind in Mind, Self, and Society
 cannot serve as supports for Aboulafia's construction of Mead's cosmo-
 politan self. In the passage quoted above Aboulafia misconstrues what
 Mead means by abstraction, and thus misconstrues the path by which
 people become internationally minded. He does not recognize how
 Mead's references to the international mind are consistent with a con-
 servative internationalism that is not egalitarian or universal.
 In the passages in Mind, Self, and Society to which Aboulafia refers,
 by "abstraction" Mead does not mean the sort of intellectual abstrac-
 tions involved in positing an impartial spectator or a community of all
 humanity. Mead clarifies the distinction between abstract and concrete
 thought this way. "In abstract thought the individual takes the attitude
 of the generalized other toward himself, without reference to its expres-
 sion in any particular other individuals; and in concrete thought he
 takes that attitude in so far as it is expressed in the attitudes toward his
 behavior of those other individuals with whom he is involved in a given
 social situation or act."53 Here, thought is abstract when it is detached
 from specific individuals, and represents the "generalized other" of spe-
 cific, functioning communities. Mead repeatedly connects the general-
 ized other, not to an abstract, ethical orientation, but to actual
 organized communities. A community exists when its members are
 organized around common interests, where social habits are expressed
 as social institutions, and where people work and live cooperatively,
 through functionally differentiated roles.54 Communities become
This content downloaded from 131.238.108.120 on Tue, 14 Mar 2017 16:56:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ro wider and more inclusive as their organizational structures become
 <u more encompassing. One can think at higher levels of abstraction when
 g the communities in which one participates are themselves wider and
 3 more inclusive. It is not the case, contra Aboulafia, that the community
 Z can become more inclusive because its members think at higher levels of
 ^ abstraction.
 <u Aboulafias examples, taken from Mead, of the international scien-
 6 tifie community and of abstract groups of creditors and debtors illus-
 - trate this point. At the time, many people referred to the international
 £> scientific community as an example of international mindedness. This
 ^ community was not an abstraction, but an actually functioning, well-
 ^ organized community of scientists from many nations. They held
 ^ international conferences, they read each others' work, and they collab-
 ^ orated across national boundaries on scientific research.55 Also, Mead is
 f-H clear that abstract groups of creditors and debtors are sub-groups
 QJ within "highly developed, organized, and complicated human social
 <^ communities."56 "Debtor" and "creditor" are not mere abstractions;
 c/D they name concrete, functionally differentiated roles in actual commu-
 ni nities, embedded within institutional structures such as a banking sys-
 <^ tern, legal contracts, a judiciary, and so on.
 P^ A close reading of Mead s references to the international mind in
 H Mind, Self, and Society ', show that Mead did not think we could arrive
 at international mindedness through intellectual abstraction, as
 Aboulafia suggests. Mead writes of international minds developing in
 tandem with the development of articulated, functioning, international
 communities. These references are consistent with conservative inter-
 nationalism, as understood at that time, and are political, rather than
 metaphysical in character. They pose problems for Aboulafias position,
 rather than supporting it.
 Mead discusses three arenas in which universal communities were
 becoming functionally organized: in economics, religion, and through
 the League of Nations.57 We can to some extent derive what he means by
 internationalism and the international mind by attending to what he
 does say about these universal communities, by noting those issues raised
 by others that Mead does not discuss, and by paying attention to his
 examples. First, a caveat. We should keep in mind that Mind, Self, and
 Society was based on stenographic lecture notes.58 Mead delivered these
 lectures to audiences that had considerable knowledge of then-current
 political events and attitudes. He could make quick references to these
 events and attitudes, and assume the students could fill in the context.
 Thus, today we should exercise caution in interpreting underdeveloped
 discussions in the text, and to the extent possible, make their contexts
 explicit. With that caution in mind, I want to make two points through
 discussing these three universal communities. First, Mead is clear he is
 ^^ using "universal" to refer to actual, historically developing communities
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 and not to philosophical abstractions such as the community of all g
 humanity or the perspective of an impartial spectator.59 Second, Meads 2
 descriptions of these communities reflect conservative internationalism p
 and not the sort of cosmopolitanism Aboulafia attributes to him. o-
 Economics: Mead begins with a simple description of exchange: X has er
 a surplus of something that Y needs. Each is "putting himself in the atti- gn
 tude of the other in the recognition of the mutual value which the fit
 exchange has for both."60 Mead implies a straightforward development g
 from the impulse to make initial exchanges of this sort to a highly articu- 5*
 lated international economic system. He writes, "The more complete §_
 economic texture appears in the development of trading itself and the gj
 development of a financial medium by means of which such trading is 5'
 carried on, and there is an inevitable adjustment of the production in one
 community to the needs of the international economic community," *
 which he calls a "concrete social organization."61 He describes the devel- 2
 opment of England's wool industry, which was instrumental in England's g
 transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, as an example. He í
 assumes a smooth transition from intra-national to inter-national indus- ^
 try, ignoring how British imperialism was deeply woven into its industri- £
 alization from the start.62 He does not address objections made at the x
 time by socialists, Marxists, and anti-imperialists, objections that pro- S3
 gressive internationalists took seriously. Instead, the picture of the inter-
 national economic community that Mead draws mirrors that of Butler
 and other conservative internationalists. These conservative internation-
 alists did not object to the fact that economic relations based on free trade
 and supported by the international legal order were maintained by elites
 and functioned primarily to their benefit.
 Mead makes a quick reference to the Monroe Doctrine that
 strengthens this interpretation. In discussing the growth of interna-
 tional mindedness, Mead asks, "The question whether we belong to a
 larger community is answered in terms of whether our own action calls
 out a response in this wider community, and whether its response is
 reflected back into our own conduct. Can we carry on a conversation in
 international terms?"63 For Mead, conversations are possible only
 among those who share a wide repertoire of gestures and significant
 symbols, drawn from an organized community's way of life. Later in
 the same paragraph Mead notes, "We have to be on good terms with
 our customers; if we are going to carry on a successful economic policy
 in South America, we must explain what is the meaning of the Monroe
 Doctrine, and so on and on."64 One could describe U.S.-Latin Ameri-
 can economic relations at the time as a community with functionally
 differentiated roles, but given how the Monroe Doctrine functioned to
 uphold U.S. hegemony in the region, I stop short of describing such a
 community as having an ethically or politically satisfactory interna-
 tionalism or cosmopolitanism. - 1 ^
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 ro Religion: In theorizing about religion, Mead begins with humans'
 cu fundamental impulses or attitudes to treat each other with kindliness
 g and sympathy. These impulses have "organizing power"; religion is the
 d vehicle through which they are socialized, as it spirals out toward becom-
 Z ing a universal community.65 Mead names Christianity, Islam, and Bud-
 ^C dhism as universalizing religions. Islam he calls a "relatively primitive
 <u sort" of religion, one that "undertook by the force of the sword to wipe
 £ out all other forms of society." Christianity and Buddhism, by contrast,
 -g are more complex forms of religion, which have brought people
 £> together, forming socialized, spiritual groups. Christianity "paved the
 ^ way for the social progress - political, economic, scientific - of the
 h^ modern world, the social progress which is so dominantly characteristic
 p. of that world."66 While religions often begin as local community cults,
 ^ through missionary work, a religion can go beyond the culture's bound-
 f-H aries, moving toward a universal community.67
 {J "Universal religion" was a common term in early twentieth century
 <^ America. It had a particular referent and carried with it particular
 co assumptions. The assumption was that as societies became more mod-
 JZ| ern and scientifically based, so-called "ethnic" or "primitive" religions
 <í would disappear, displaced universally by Christianity or a variant
 P^ thereof. While Mead's discussion of universal religion is sketchy, it is
 H consistent with this common cultural usage. Whether Mead intended
 to or not, his discussion of universal religion conveyed to his audience
 a cosmopolitanism or international-mindedness that was Euro-centric
 and non-egalitarian.68
 The League of Nations: Finally, Mead had strong hopes for the
 League of Nations. Alice Hamilton, a close family friend, wrote to her
 sister in 1923, "Wednesday evening I dined with the Meads. . . . George
 grows increasingly less intimate and less interesting. He is a fanatical
 adherent of the League and assumes that all the woes of Europe will be
 over when once we have joined it. ... When I think of the way a talk
 with him used to stretch my mind I feel as if I had lost something."69
 In Hamilton's comment we hear both her own, and Mead's, pain.
 We need to take Mead's references to the League of Nations seri-
 ously. For Mead, the League of Nations was not just an illustration for
 a more general point. It was the location through which the interna-
 tional community of nation-states would take form and through which
 this community's generalized other would arise, making the interna-
 tional mind possible. Mead writes that universal community in a polit-
 ical sense "gets an expression in the League of Nations, where every
 community recognizes every other community in the very process of
 asserting itself."70
 Now Mead never claims that the League of Nations had played its
 part well, or that its members were well advanced toward establishing
 _^n functional relationships. Nonetheless, in light of the League of Nations'
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 centrality to Meads discussions of the international mind, I find it odd g
 that Mead does not address questions about the League that raged at 8
 the time. For example, he does not express concern about the initial p
 membership of the League. Hamilton had been suspicious of the o-
 League from the beginning, stating "I was one of those who would have Sr
 none of it, thinking it would be only a League of the Victors, a second ~
 Holy Alliance." She continues, "Miss Addams, as always, was for FJ
 accepting even a quarter-loaf, and doing as much with it as could be g
 done. But she did lament the sheer unwisdom of the course followed at g*
 the founding of the League." Dewey worried that some unenthusiastic jjj^
 nation-states might consider the League to be a mechanism for the g
 United States, the British Empire, and France "to control the com- 3'
 mercé of the world, and to achieve . . . virtual subjugation of all other
 peoples." 71 Also, Mead does not distinguish between nation-states, and m
 national groups located within or lying across state-lines; protection of 2
 oppressed minority nationals was a major debate at the League.72 Nor 2
 does Mead discuss the fears and aspirations of colonized peoples, 5
 another major topic of discussion at the League.73 In light of these ^
 silences, it is problematic to take Mead's comments about the League of £
 Nations as indications of a thoroughly humanitarian cosmopolitanism. x
 In spite of these problems with how Mead characterizes these three S
 universal communities, Mead is clear that he is thinking of actual, his-
 torically developing, functionally articulated communities, and not of
 peoples powers of imagination or abstraction. While it is true that
 Mead's discussions of these communities is underdeveloped, his refer-
 ences to these communities as they were then being constituted imply
 attitudes and institutional structures that we today interpret as imperi-
 alist and Euro-centric. If Aboulafia wants to use Mead's references to
 the international mind and to universal communities to support his
 claim that Mead had a conception of a cosmopolitan self, he needs to
 address Meads conservative internationalism directly and explicitly.
 IV "National Mindedness and International Mindedness, " 1929
 In this article we see that Mead has moved some distance from posi-
 tions he took during the war. He says very little about the international
 mind in this article, but he probes the national mind, extending and
 deepening his 1915 concerns about community and violence.
 First, though, an astonishing admission. In the course of comment-
 ing on why nations have been willing to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact
 that outlawed war, Mead writes,
 We have learned more from the published archives of Foreign Offices
 than we have from the records of battlefields and atrocities. We have
 learned that those who controlled public policies and finally mobilized
 armies were utilizing fears and hatreds and cupidities and individual
 521
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 rt"ì greeds and jealousies which were far from representing issues over
 Jj which the communities themselves wished to fight or thought they
 ^ were fighting."74
 ^ For readers in the 21st century, this passage runs by quickly. I wonder,
 ^ though, if Mead was rejecting his stance of August 1917, when he con-
 ^ strued the war as a fight between autocracy and democracy. By this time,
 g the Allies' secret treaties to divide up Germany's colonial possessions, in
 J2 direct contradiction to Wilsons democratic commitment to national self-
 £> determination, had become public knowledge.75 Bertrand Russell's 1915
 analysis was proven right. The war was a tragic episode issuing from the
 ^ imperial powers' "great game," with duplicities on all sides.76
 ^ ^ By 1929 the League of Nations was established and functioning.
 ^ While not a member of the League of Nations, the United States had
 r, signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war except in self-defense.
 rj The U.S. insisted that its right to self-defense included upholding the
 ^ Monroe Doctrine throughout the western hemisphere.77 Mead sees the
 co League and the Pact as holding promise. He writes that the League of
 ^ Nations is "the most serious undertaking to end war which interna-
 <^ tional society has ever made. ... A hopeful project has been put into
 CÚ actual operation, and the relations of nations have been subject to a
 f- i publicity and a sort of criticism which are novel in history."78 He
 explores this question: since nation-states are the units that meet at the
 League of Nations, what sort of community unity, i.e., the basis for the
 community's generalized other, does a nation need in order to be able
 to settle differences peaceably with other nations?
 As in his 1915 essay, Mead again seeks a psychological analysis for
 why communities resort to violence to settle disputes. Mead turns to
 James's analyses of "the rooted bellicosity of human nature" as the
 underlying cause. Mead thinks James overstates the case, commenting
 that people can satisfy their "bellicosity" by watching movies and read-
 ing detective stories. But he does think James is getting at something.
 That is, war can be the occasion for individuals to identify their own
 good completely with the common good. He asks, "How shall we get
 and maintain that unity of society in which alone we can exist?" The
 Great War proved that Armageddon was the price of this sort of unity.
 We cannot afford the costs of "feeling" unity; we must "think" it,
 instead. Instead of a felt "national soul", we need to achieve a "national
 mind" through which to think our unity. However, thinking by itself
 will not generate a national mind. Since our rationality comes from
 internalized social organization, the social organization itself needs to
 be capable of generating common interests, and we need to be able to
 think of divergent individual interests, not as conflicting, but as differ-
 ences in function. The test for national mindedness, then, is whether
 the community can identify its common interests and bring these to
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 the fore in addressing disputes. If it can, the community will be able to g
 settle its quarrels civilly and not via physical force.79 2
 We do not now have such a national mind, Mead claims, the kind of p
 mind that nations need in order for a League of Nations or a Kellogg- o-
 Briand Pact to work. The use of violence in settling intra-national dis- sr
 putes is the indicator that we have not achieved national-mindedness. ~
 In the 1920s racial and labor tensions were rife, and protestors were fit
 quickly labeled as Bolsheviks and thereby silenced.80 Mead claims that g
 as long as the nation responds to labor unrest by calling out the mili- §•
 tary, it cannot claim to be nationally-minded.81 S-
 There is also our national mythology, how our sense of national g
 pride and honor are confirmed by our willingness to fight.82 Mead con- 5'
 nects this to the Monroe Doctrine, which in 1928 got some messy pub-
 licity as a number of Latin American countries asserted their grave
 displeasure at the Doctrine, and especially at the U.S. s practice of 2
 defining and applying it unilaterally. Now, in 1929, Mead claims that 2
 the U.S. s continued insistence on the Monroe Doctrine indicates that 5
 the U.S. is still seeking unity based on the fighting spirit, and not on a ^
 national mind. Mead wryly notes, "None are agreed upon what the 5
 doctrine is .... No, it is something - no matter what it is - for which x
 we will fight. . . . We must be of one mind about it, for it is impossible *
 to have different minds about that which no one can comprehend. The
 only issue involved in the Monroe Doctrine is this, are you a patriot, are
 you a red-blooded American, or are you a mollycoddle?"83
 The real reason, Mead claims, why the U.S. holds tight to the Mon-
 roe Doctrine in spite of its unintelligibility, is that the U.S. sees the
 Doctrine as the final indicator for national honor and national self-
 respect. Mead interprets this as reflecting a sense of national insecurity.
 If a nation were secure in itself, it could then approach negotiating both
 internal and international disputes without needing the threat of vio-
 lence to back itself up. Mead thinks the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact and
 the League of Nations take us half-way. The other thing that is needed
 is a secure national-mindedness in the sense of trusting adjudication
 over force. He ends the essay by declaring, "We will get rid of the mech-
 anism of warfare only as our common life permits the individual to
 identify his own ends and purposes with those of the community of
 which he is a part and which has endowed him with a self."84
 I do not know how much Meads new appraisal of the Monroe Doc-
 trine merely reflected widespread changes in public opinion or whether
 it indicates a change in his internationalism. In either case, Meads
 exploration in this essay is remarkable. Most discussions of the national
 mind in the post-war years centered on the question of what constitutes
 a nation by examining the significance of race, language, shared cul-
 ture, and so on.85 Mead bypasses that discussion altogether. In his own
 way Mead has come to one of Addams' main themes in Newer Ideals of - -«
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 /Vtfre, that eliminating internal violence is an essential dimension of
 achieving international peace. I wish Mead had continued his thinking
 about violence, and had drawn out more thoroughly the implications
 for the international mind. I wish he had explored more deeply how
 violence fractures communities and fractures selves. I wish he had
 placed his theory of the generalized other next to DuBois s "double-
 consciousness," where the generalized other that DuBois internalizes is
 full of contempt.86 I would like to see Mead interacting with contem-
 poraries such as Kallen, Jacks, and Mecklin, who theorized the interna-
 tional mind more directly than Mead.87 He died too soon.
 This paper is as much about the need to locate political and philo-
 sophical rhetoric, as it is an examination of Mead's thinking. "Interna-
 tional mind," "enlarged mentality," "universal religion," and other
 phrases that Mead used were culturally laden terms. To understand
 what Mead meant by those terms, we need to place his writings in close
 conversation with a range of his own contemporaries, as well as with
 canonical philosophers.
 University of Dayton
 fischer@udayton. edu
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 3. His Chicago Herald articles include "Germany's Crisis - Its Effect on
 Labor - Part I," "Germany's Crisis - Its Effect on Labor - Part II," "War Issue to
 U.S. Forced by Kaiser," "Americas Ideals and the War," and "Democracy's Issues
 in the World War."
 4. Dewey uses the term "national mind" in "In Time of National Hesitation,"
 258; "social" and "legal" mind in "The Approach to a League of Nations," 128;
 "popular mind" in "On Understanding the Mind of Germany," 225; the "fore-
 warned mind" in "On Understanding the Mind of Germany," 220; and the "post-
 war mind" in an essay by that title, 112.
 5. Bourne refers to the "war mind" in "The War and the Intellectuals," 3; to
 the "state mind" and the "herd mind" in "The State," 84; and to the "interna-
 tional mind" in "The Disillusionment," 398.
 6. Jacks, "The Changing Mind of a Nation at War," 534-536.
 7. Kallen, 1 he International Mind, 56.
 8. Burns, "Making the International Mind"; Leigh ton, "Educational Pre-
 paredness for Peace," 17-21.
 9. Jones, International Mind Alcoves.
 10. Lewis, Main Street, (Chapter 22, section 6, p. 268). http://etext. virginia.
 edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=LewMain.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/
 texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part= 1 12&division=div2
 11. Crowther, "Minding Our Own Business," 54.
 1 2 . Butler, The International Mind 1 02 .
 13. Butler, The International Mind 69 '.
 14. Butler, The International Mind 103.
 15. Butler, The International Mind 48-51, 9, 38.
 16. This assumption is implicit in Butlers discussion of the Agadir affair. See
 The International Mind 99.
 17. Butler, The International Mind 99; see Lyons, World War I: A Short History
 32-33.
 18. Jean de Bloch, The Future of War and Norman Angeli, The Illusion of War.
 19. Bourne, "The Disillusionment," 398.
 20. For the relation of war and hostile instincts, see Russell, "Why Nations Love
 War"; Russell, "The Ethics of War"; and Murray, "Herd Instinct and the War." On
 the need to reorganize the international system of nation-states, see Dickinson, "The
 War and the Way Out"; Dickinson, "The War and the Way Out: A Further Con-
 sideration"; and Russell, "National Independence and Internationalism."
 2 1 . Mead, Psychological Basis, 606.
 22. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 606.
 23. For the German point of view, see Delbriick, "Germany's Answer;" also
 Russell, "An Appeal to Intellectuals." In May 1915 Addams and Hamilton met
 with citizens and with heads of state and foreign ministers from both the Central
 Powers and the Triple Entente, all of whom claimed that their respective countries
 acted in self-defense. See Women at The Hague, Chapters 2 and 3.
 24. Mead, Psychological Basis," 604; L.P. Jacks observed this phenomenon in
 England during the early months of the war. See "The Peacefulness of Being at
 War."
 25. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 606.
 26. In Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology (1909)
 Mead refers to work by McDougall and others on primitive instincts and impulses
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 and discusses how these instincts are stimulated in response to the gestures of oth-
 ers. See 97-101.
 27. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 604-605.
 28. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 605. Hobson made this point in 1902 in
 Imperialismy 133. Dickinson gives the same critique of military preparedness in
 "The War and the Way Out," 835; and in "After the War," 113.
 29. "The Social Self," 146; Mead, "Psychological Basis," 604. Prior to writing
 "The Psychological Basis for Internationalism" in 1915, Mead had discussed how
 the self becomes a self by taking in "the attitude of another" in "The Mechanism
 of Social Consciousness" (1912) and "The Social Self" (1913).
 30. This point was also commonly made at the time. See Bender, A Nation
 Among Nations y Chapter 5, on the international character of social reform move-
 ments.
 31. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 605.
 32. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 606, 607; For analyses of Roosevelt's mas-
 culinist imagery see Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, Chapter 6.
 33. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 607.
 34. Dickinson, "The War and the Way Out" and "After the War"; and Russell,
 "The Ethics of War", 139.
 35. Butler, "The International Mind: How to Develop It," 18.
 36. Knock. To End All Wars 50.
 37. Knock, To End All Wars 50-55.
 38. Marburg, "The League to Enforce Peace," 51; Knock, To EndAllWars 55-
 58; on Mead's membership in the League to Enforce Peace see Rucker, 21.
 39. Mead makes the point that U.S. participation in international affairs
 depended on its access to the seas. With Germany's declaration of unrestricted
 submarine warfare, the U.S. s options were to fight for the right of continued
 international engagement or to acquiesce into isolation. See "War Issue to U.S.
 Forced by Kaiser." Also, "Americas Ideals and the War."
 40. Joas, G.K Mead, 24, 25.
 41. Joas, G.K Mead 26.
 42. Mead, "America's Ideals and the War." In an unpublished manuscript on
 colonization in Hawaii, Mead encouraged American farmers to settle there. After
 discussing the potential for various crops on the islands, he concludes the essay by
 stating, "It (the Hawaiian territory) needs American men to roll back the tide of
 oriental population which has threatened to take possession of this gateway to our
 western coast. Hawaii lies at the cross-roads of the Pacific. The power that holds
 Hawaii commands the western coast of the continent and has the only base of
 supply for over 2000 miles. The East and the West have met in Hawaii and thanks
 to the vigor of Americans it still belongs to the nation who must own it. It needs
 to be occupied still more completely by Americans who can adapt themselves to
 the Islands in order to possess them" (22-23).
 43. Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings, viii-ix, 4-6, 14.
 44. Roosevelt, "Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine"; See also Dawley, Chang-
 ing the World, 79; and Whitaker, "The U.S. in Latin America to 1933: An
 Overview," 326.
 45. See Dawley, Changing the World, Chapter 3.
 46. Addams, Newer Ideals of Peace •, Chapter 8; Mead, "Review oí Newer Ideals
 of Peace?
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 47. On the Woman's Peace Party's protests against U.S. intervention in the
 Caribbean and Mexico, see Degen, The History of the Woman's Peace Party, 168-
 173. McDowell, Helen Mead, and Dr. Myrna Mead are listed as members of the
 Chicago branch. See Woman's Peace Party Microfilm, Reel 3. Knock claims there
 is strong evidence that interventions by the Woman's Peace Party and the Ameri-
 can Union Against Militarism, were crucial toward keeping Wilson from going to
 war with Mexico in 1916. See To End All Wars, 82.
 48. Bourne, "Twilight of Idols"; Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 82.
 49. Mind, Self, and Society was published posthumously and carries a 1934
 copyright date. Much, but not all of the material is based on lectures Mead gave
 in 1927. I hypothesize that the passages I work with are from 1927 lecture notes.
 After the events of 1928, Mead would not have referred to the Monroe Doctrine
 in the way he does in the portion of the text I use.
 50. Aboulafia, The Cosmopolitan Self, 13, 47.
 51. Aboulafia, The Cosmopolitan Self, 20.
 52. Aboulafia, The Cosmopolitan Self see especially chapter 2.
 53. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 155-56.
 54. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 154-158; Mead, Movements of Thought,
 366, 375.
 55. See, for example, Kallen, "The International Mind," 58; Addams, Long
 Road ofWomans Memory, 59-60.
 56. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 157.
 57. See Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 281-298.
 58. In Charles W. Morris s Preface to Mind, Self, and Society, vi.
 59. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 289.
 60. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 258.
 61. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 282; 301-02. In his 1907 book, The New
 Internationalism, Harold Bolee defined internationalism purely in terms of laissez-
 faire economics.
 62. For a discussion of how imperialism and colonization were integral parts
 of the development of England's cotton industry, see Marks, The Origin of the
 Modern World, Chapter 4.
 63. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society 271.
 64. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society 271.
 65. Mead defines impulses or attitudes as "fundamental socio-physiological
 impulses or behavior tendencies which are common to all human individuals."
 Mind, Self and Society 303; 290, 258, 272.
 66. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 302, 281-82, 293; Mead does not mention
 counter-examples. I don't know if he was aware of how Charlemagne used his
 sword and cross campaigns to conquer Europe, or of how many North Africans,
 weary of corrupt Byzantine rule, welcomed the Muslims as they moved westward.
 67. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 296, 302.
 68. For an overview on universal religion during the early twentieth century
 see Masuzawa, "World Religions." Selections by Barrows, "Results of the Parlia-
 ment of Religions" and Miiller, "The Real Significance of the Parliament of Reli-
 gion," in A Museum of Faiths, edited by Ziolkowski, give contrasting views on the
 relation of Christianity to universal religion.
 69. Sicherman, ed. Alice Hamilton: A Life in Letters, 268-269. Hamilton
 resided at Hull-House. A physician, she virtually invented the field of industrial
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 medicine, and became the first woman professor at Harvard Medical School. She
 was a founding member of the Woman's Peace Party and the Women's Interna-
 tional League for Peace and Freedom, and remained a pacifist throughout the war.
 70. Mead, Mini Self, and Society, 287.
 71. Hamilton, Exploring the Dangerous Trades, 235; Dewey, "A League of
 Nations and Economic Freedom," 140.
 72. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 402-406; Swanwick, Collective
 Insecurity.
 73. Knock, To End All Wars, 210-214; Macmillan, Paris 191% Chapter 8.
 74. Mead, National Mindedness and International Mindedness, 386.
 75. On secret treaties see Dawley, Changing the World, 177; Knock, To End All
 Wars, 138; Macmillan, Paris 191% 105.
 76. Russell, "Is a Permanent Peace Possible?" 368.
 77. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 387.
 78. Mead, National Mindedness, 389.
 79. Mead, "National Mindedness," 390-392, 397, 400-402.
 80. Dawley, Changing the world, 160-161, 260; Addams was under govern-
 ment surveillance and charged with being a Bolshevik, see Davis, American Hero-
 ine, 251-254.
 81. Mead, "National Mindedness," 401-402.
 82. Pillsbury, in The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism, uses
 national honor in conceptualizing what constitutes a nation. He states that having
 a sense of national honor is the test of whether immigrants have accepted their
 adopted nation as truly theirs. See 216-217.
 83. Mead, "National Mindedness," 398.
 84. Mead, National Mindedness, 406-407.
 85. For post-war writings on the national mind see e.g., Pillsbury, The Psychol-
 ogy of Nationality and Internationalism, Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internation-
 alism," and McDougall, The Group Mind, Chapters 6-7.
 86. DuBois, The Soub of Black Folk, Chapter 1.
 87. Kallen, The Structure of Lasting Peace, and "The International Mind";
 Jacks, "The International Mind," and Mecklin, "The International Conscience."
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